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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to both understand and depathologize clinically significant mental distress related to
criminalized contact with psychoactive biotic substances by employing a framework known as critical political
ecology of health and disease from the subdiscipline of medical geography. The political ecology of disease
framework joins disease ecology with the power-calculus of political economy and calls for situating health-related
phenomena in their broad social and economic context, demonstrating how large-scale global processes are at
work at the local level, and giving due attention to historical analysis in understanding the relevant human-
environment relations. Critical approaches to the political ecology of health and disease have the potential to
incorporate ever-broadening social, political, economic, and cultural factors to challenge traditional causes,
definitions, and sociomedical understandings of disease. Inspired by the patient-centered medical diagnosis
critiques in medical geography, this paper will use a critical political ecology of disease approach to challenge
certain prevailing sociomedical interpretations of disease, or more specifically, mental disorder, found in the field of
substance abuse diagnostics and the related American punitive public policy regimes of substance abuse
prevention and control, with regards to the use of biotic substances. It will do this by first critically interrogating
the concept of “substances” and grounding them in an ecological context, reviewing the history of both the
development of modern substance control laws and modern substance abuse diagnostics, and understanding the
biogeographic dimensions of such approaches. It closes with proposing a non-criminalizing public health approach
for regulating human close contact with psychoactive substances using the example of cannabis use.
Giving ‘Substances’ substance and place
‘Substance’ is a shorthand term used in common par-
lance for ‘psychoactive substance’, a pharmacologically
active, consumable material, usually self-administered,
that can reliably have, among other physiological effects,
a discernible impact on one’s mood, emotions, feelings,
sensations, perceptions, and/or thinking. For the last cen-
tury, consumption of a select group of psychoactive sub-
stances has been a matter of pressing political concern
for modern State bureaucracies, and in that time all man-
ner of popular conceptions concerning substance use,
abuse, dependence, and addiction have had ample oppor-
tunity to be race-baited, red-baited, even gay-baited,
chauvinistically slanted, politicized, inflated, and
conflated due to a variety of cultural-historical reasons
such as scapegoating, xenophobia, and ‘culture wars’ over
the years, which an extensive literature has documented
(see, for example:[1-3]). Nosology and diagnostics for
substance-related mental disorders developed in health
professional social circles and codified in standard psy-
chiatry manuals have similarly shifted over time, with
earnest attempts made in recent years at their summary
de-politicization by mental health professionals and ‘dru-
gabuseologists’. But notwithstanding these efforts at
putative ‘scientific sanitization’, this paper argues that
long-hardened commitments to the normalized ideology
of pharmacologicalism, eloquently described by
DeGrandpre [4] as providing “a scientific foundation for
the moral ordering of drugs” ( p .2 7 ) ,a si nt h eg o o dv s .
bad/angel vs. demon/legal vs. illegal psychoactive sub-
stance dichotomies enshrined in high-level public policy,
have uncritically been allowed to take root in medical
diagnostic screening criteria for substance-related mental
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codified in the internationally used fourth edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) [5], when a
person engages in a pattern of substance use that leads to
mental distress as manifested by their recurrent or year-
long persisting substance possession-related legal pro-
blems, that person’s substance use is seen as maladaptive,
is summarily labeled pathologically self-abusive, and the
individual is judged to be mentally disordered. While a
fifth edition of DSM (DSM-V) is in the works which has
proposed removal of diagnostic consideration of such
legal problems, it is still undergoing revisions and not
due for publication until May 2013 [6].
One may pause here and ask: what does any of this talk
about the use of psychoactive substances have to do with
a politics of the environment? Why address substance
abuse diagnostic questions with a political ecology frame-
work? Should this not be left to critical cultural studies of
mental illness and psychiatry? That such questions even
bubble to the surface is indicative of how successful the
social mystifications that have arisen around psychoactive
substance use have been in obscuring its basis in human
relationships with the natural environment. Though
often overlooked, many of the contested psychoactive
substances in currency today (e.g., opium, coca, and can-
nabis) are botanicals found in the natural environment
that evolved tens of millions of years ago. Very basic and
well-defined human-environment relationships underpin
the discovery, production, and consumption of all biotic
psychoactive substances. Ultimately, it is argued here,
addressing questions about human adaptation (or mala-
daptation) to psychoactive substance-replete natural
environments, both at the societal and individual levels,
is central for any clearheaded, scientific understanding of
a given individual’s substance use patterns and attendant
mental distress that may be manifested, in order to judge
whether that distress has a firm basis in psychopathology
or not. The critical political ecology of disease approach
is a suitable lens to use to address this question. Applying
the rubric to such issues is not without precedent, as one
veteran political ecologist, Paul Robbins, has called for a
“political ecology of the drug trade” [7](p. 215), the
beginnings of which have been sketched by Steinberg
et al. [8,9].
Biotic substances usage can quite literally be grounded
in precise and particular locales, yet the prevailing concep-
tions of substance use are anything-but grounded. It is a
marvel that practical scholarship, to say nothing of policy,
regarding a whole class of human-biota consumptive rela-
tions remains to this day to be wholly divorced from con-
siderations of environmental ethics, co-evolution, and
ecology. Take for example academic studies on proble-
matic crack-cocaine consumption in American urban
inner cities. While most studies of morbidity, morality,
and social cost will examine social factors such as poverty,
deprivation, and glamour surrounding problematic use
and local distribution of the substance, rarely, if ever, will
a study trace the crack-cocaine used by subjects to the
thousands of pounds of coca leaves which were planted,
grown, and harvested from which the cocaine alkaloid was
extracted and later reacted with baking soda (sodium
bicarbonate) and heat to produce crack ‘rocks’ that
‘appear’ in glass vials in the inner city for consumption.
Nor will such studies earnestly question the normalized
contraband status of the coca leaf botanical and the che-
micals extracted from it, and what impacts that contra-
band status has on the chain of events linking problematic
consumption of the substance in an urban inner city in
the United States to, for example, cultivation practices in a
Northern Peruvian rural village.
Understandably, the contraband status of such botani-
cals limits depth of inquiry. However, the problem could
also be one of obfuscating terminology. While humans
have lived and evolved within a world composed of mate-
rial substance (and energy), psychoactive portions of this
s u b s t a n c eh a v ec o m et ob ek n o w n ,w i t hn oe f f o r ta t
semiotic clarity, simply as ‘substances’.F o rt h es a k eo f
rational grounding, let us divide these into biotic sub-
stances and abiotic substances. Biotic psychoactive sub-
stances are naturally occurring organisms that are an
integral part of the biosphere and web of life in the same
sense that any other terrestrially-evolved organisms are.
They have unique secondary metabolite biochemical pro-
files that set them apart from other biota in that they con-
tain chemicals that can robustly interact with endogenous
systems of mood regulation, pleasure, muscle relaxation,
and brain reward (among others) in humans and often-
times other animals. They are the focus of this paper. As
far as the abiotic substances are concerned, some, but not
all of them, are unmodified or slightly modified concen-
trates of chemicals that were naturally biosynthesized in
biotic substances. Others are novel products of the syn-
thetic age.
A political ecology of mental distress
Across cultures and throughout history and pre-history
[10], human beings have known about biotic organisms
living in their natural environments that, when intention-
ally ingested in whole or in part, could “stimulate, sedate,
[palliate,] or elate” [11](p. 356). In the modern era, an
arbitrary subgrouping of these living organisms, be they
plants or fungi, along with the unique chemicals they
produce and their related congeners, have become the
locus of intense medical, public health, and international
law enforcement focus. Today many who use biotic sub-
stances are vigorously pursued by law enforcement and
punished by criminal justice systems using methods and
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example, in the United States, the penalty for cannabis
possession can be as severe as one year in federal prison
for possession of any amount of marijuana, and up to five
years in federal prison for growing one marijuana plant
[12]. The death penalty is routinely used abroad and
available to prosecutors in some cases in the US, multi-
decadal mandatory prison sentences are routinely meted
out to drug offenders, and other violations of drug offen-
ders’ privacy and family integrity are normalized. This,
understandably, produces significant mental distress for
those involved with these contraband biotic substances.
The ultimate stated purpose of the entire medico-legal
apparatus positioned against these substances derives its
final justification from a claim to act towards the ‘pre-
vention and control’ of ‘substance abuse’ by individuals.
A critical political ecology of disease perspective can
shed light on the origins of substance use mental dis-
tress as manifested by biota possession legal problems
and help address the central question: must this mental
distress necessarily be viewed as a pathological sign of a
maladaptive substance use pattern? After all, consump-
tion, possession, or close proximity to biotic substances
are all instantiations of particular human-environment
relationships of close contact which, for now, are crimi-
nalized. When the latter fact is made manifest in one’s
life through encounters with some form of law enforce-
ment, it is understandably mentally distressing consider-
ing the harsh punitive consequences that are allowed by
law and routinely meted out.
On a personal note, the first author can attest to the rea-
lity of this mental distress, as he has personally experi-
enced the mental distress of potential contraband biota
possession-related legal problems and has been a target of
a harassment episode where the threat of exposing his
past consumption practices to law enforcement and other
authority figures was used to terrorize him. This author
has feared arrest, losing funding, being disqualified for
professional licensure, being expelled from collegiate and
professional training schools, and has feared for his loved
ones being caught in harm’s way for his actions. Given the
extensive use of informants in drug law enforcement, not
knowing whom or how much to trust someone has also
been a source of mental distress for him. This author has
also personally met individuals who were hunted and cap-
tured by law enforcement officials at local, county, state,
and federal levels for their contraband biota-related activ-
ities. He has met people living with serious illnesses (e.g.,
rheumatoid arthritis, failed-back surgery syndromes, can-
cers, chronic pain) who have literally been terrorized,
whose bodies have been tortured when incarcerated or
pulled from organ transplantation lists, or forcibly denied
access to therapeutic and palliative cannabis consumption
or other medical treatment. He has met many patients in
clinical scenarios who might benefit from the medicinal
use of contraband biota with potential therapeutic utility,
such as cannabis, and felt the frustration of being unable
to offer or try these therapeutic options due to the illegal
status of these substances. He has met people who were
facing or have faced life sentences for their cannabis culti-
vation practices–even when that cannabis was being used
for medical purposes. He has met others who have faced
grave legal consequences and attendant distress such as
lengthy incarceration or its threat related to their posses-
sion and consumption of other biotic psychoactive sub-
stances, such as Psilocybe fungi. This author is also
familiar with many other cases that he has read about or
learned about from trusted sources. In sharp relief to this,
he has also met people who have complete amnesty and
sanctuary from prosecution related to their contraband
biota consumption or production practices. He has met
the grower who produces cannabis for the United States
federal government and who holds the patent on single-
cannabinoid medicine marketed as a legal alternative to
contraband cannabinoid botanicals. He has met three out
of four of the ill and disabled American patients who, as a
result of a landmark lawsuit, are supplied cannabis to con-
sume by the federal government because their physicians
attested to its profound therapeutic value for them, and he
has also met chronically ill patients in Canada who have
been granted amnesty by the Canadian government to
produce and consume cannabis. Finally, he has met indivi-
duals in various cafes in Vancouver, British Columbia and
Amsterdam, Holland who enjoy relative freedom in public
spaces that grant them a sanctuary for cannabis and Psilo-
cybe fungi consumption. The existence of such widely
divergent scenarios of amnesty and terror helps to under-
score the critical role the environment plays in producing
or preventing mental distress related to contraband psy-
choactive biota consumption.
Applying a political ecology of mental distress approach
can help to understand how individuals and groups react
to such environments. The clash between localized under-
standings of particular human-environment interactions
and medical and public policy interpretations of those
same interactions creates stressful conditions to which
individuals and groups adapt. The modern concept of
human adaptation has its roots in the cultural ecological
work of the mid-1950s spearheaded by Julian Steward, stu-
dent of the renowned anthropologist Alfred Kroeber
[13,14]. The geographer Bennett [15] in his book on the
inhabitants of the Great Plains of North America, helped
to bring the human adaptation concept into geography.
He offers valuable insight to the nature and type of adapta-
tion patterns that individuals and groups practice when
responding to problems and stressors. He sees adaptive
behaviors as coping mechanisms that take a multitude of
forms including “problem-solving, decision-making,
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migrating, staying” (p. 11). To define or measure adapta-
tion, Bennett suggests looking in terms of goal-satisfaction
and resource conservation (p. 13). He insists on making
the very useful distinction between adaptive strategies and
adaptive processes. Adaptive strategies pertain to “the pat-
tern formed by the many separate adjustments that people
devise in order to obtain and use resources and solve
immediate problems” and are generally conscious deci-
sions. Adaptive processes pertain to “changes introduced
over relatively long periods of time by the repeated use of
such strategies or the making of many adjustments” and
usually can be seen only by outside observers (p.14). The
study of human adaptation patterns is a significant part of
work in human geography and has been examined in
diverse contexts, from natural hazards and threats to sub-
altern studies of peasant resistance strategies.
Given the universal, embodied human experience of dis-
tress and threat, it should be no surprise that adaptation
to various types of environmentally-induced distress may
take similar forms. Mitchell [16], in a review on the geo-
graphic study of natural hazards, states as much: “the
insights of natural hazard research may aid in developing
general theories of man-environment relations. The possi-
bility exists that models of human response to environ-
mental threat may also function as analogs for research on
man’s adjustment to more pervasive forms of social stress”
(p. 312). Medical geographer Mayer [17] also recognizes
the relevance of socially stressful stimuli for a political
ecology of disease framework: “it is important in the con-
text of political ecology to ascertain the causes, both inten-
tional and unintentional, of social isolation and
marginalization” (p.451). It is additionally equally impor-
tant to ascertain the responses and adaptations of indivi-
duals and groups to conditions that produce these sorts of
social stress.
Literature in ecological anthropology, such as work by
Vayda and McCay [18], has made significant headway in
showing how the category of hazards can subsume “social
and psychological insults” such as mental distress which
produce demonstrable “psychological and behavior adap-
tations strategies.” In their review of work in this area,
they write broadly about the nature of various hazards
that face organisms and groups and their responses. They
are particularly concerned with those hazards that lead to
“t h er i s ko fl o s i n ga n‘existential game’ in which success
consists simply in staying in the game” (p.293). This aptly
describes the hazards faced by those who produce and
consume or otherwise come into close contact with con-
traband biota, such as cannabis and other forbidden biotic
substances. Indeed, Vayda and McCay see the notion of
‘hazards’ to encompass not only “extreme geophysical
events such as floods, frosts, droughts, hurricanes, and tor-
nadoes” but also “predation by warfare, plundering or
raiding...exactions of tribute and taxes...or acts of religious
persecution” (p.294). Those affected by the psychoactive
substance prohibitions under a policy commonly known
as the ‘war on drugs’, variously referred to by its detractors
as ‘the pharmacratic inquisition’ or ‘psychopharmacologi-
cal Calvinism’ [19-22], do certainly perceive their life
hazards with terms such as predations, raiding, and perse-
cution. These hazards form the backbone of the adapta-
tion pressures to consider in a political ecology of mental
distress at facing possession-related legal problems.
Substance-related disorders diagnostics and
possession-related legal problems
The ‘substance’ nomenclature was first widely popularized
as a result of sweeping, comprehensive, and international
template-setting United States federal legislation passed by
the Congress in 1970 and still in effect today. This legisla-
tion, known as the Controlled Substances Act, created a
chapter under Title 21 “FOOD AND DRUGS” of the fed-
eral code: “CHAPTER 13 - DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION
AND CONTROL.” Note the clear and explicit language
that identifies this as a public health-styled disease “preven-
tion and control” regulatory schema. Under this policy, a
system of five ‘Controlled Substance’ Schedules was cre-
ated. In moving from Schedule V to Schedule I, increasing
degrees of criminal prohibition apply, with Schedule I ‘sub-
stances’ falling for all practical purposes into the category
of total prohibition (with exemptions granted for extremely
limited medico-scientific research, religious use, and
‘instruction’). Substances in Schedules V, IV, III, and II are
allowed for progressively restricted medical use and
research but are otherwise prohibited. According to the
regulations, Schedules I and II apply when “The drug or
other substance has a high potential for abuse.” Biotic psy-
choactive substances appear only in Schedules I and II.
They either appear directly by name (e.g., “Marihuana”,
“Peyote”, “Opium poppy”), or by implied identification
with a unique secondary metabolite made by the organism
(e.g., “Psilocybin” r e f e r r i n gt oam e t a b o l i t em a d eb y1 8 6
species of Psilocybe fungi). On an official government web-
site, the name of the organism that produces the scheduled
metabolite is listed alongside the chemical name [23]. To
give an idea of size, currently 132 substances are listed in
Schedule I, 62 in Schedule II, 31 in Schedule III; 70 in
Schedule IV; and 10 in Schedule V–305 ‘controlled’ sub-
stance in all [24]. These can be referred to as the ‘Con-
trolled 305’. In this vast controlled substance-scape, the
focus of this paper is in on biotic psychoactive substances,
which have a far more extensive history of human use and
are far more easily studied with a political ecology lens
compared to abiotic ones (though the two are surely inter-
connected). The number of distinct biological organisms
represented in the ‘Controlled 305’ probably number in the
low hundreds (with psilocybin-, dimethyltryptamine-, and
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vast majority [25,19]. It is worth noting that several of the
305 substances appear endogenously in the human body,
such as dimethyltryptamine [26] and morphine [27]. If one
is charged for this internal possession of controlled sub-
stances or worried about it, perhaps one can mount the
defense of ‘guilt by association’! All absurdities aside, the
final downstream target of this entire enforcement schema
has to do with particular situations in which human bodies
make close contact with one of these politicized plants,
fungi, or chemicals, and the ensuing embodied experiences
that follow as a result of the body’s absorption of active
chemicals into its bloodstream. Given this context, do
these consumptive experiences amount to ‘drug’ or ‘Sub-
stance’ Abuse?
In the current fourth edition of the American Psychiatric
Association’s DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for
Mental Disorders) [5], Substance-Related Disorders are
divided into two groups: the Substance Use Disorders
(Substance Dependence and Substance Abuse) and the
Substance-Induced Disorders (Substance Intoxication,
Substance Withdrawal, Substance-Induced Delirium, Sub-
stance-Induced Persisting Dementia, Substance-Induced
Persisting Amnestic Disorder, Substance-Induced Psycho-
tic Disorder, Substance-Induced Mood Disorder, Sub-
stance-Induced Anxiety Disorder, Substance-Induced
Sexual Dysfunction, and Substance-Induced Sleep Disor-
der). Of these, the mental disorders that will be focused
on here are the Substance Use Disorders, especially Sub-
stance Abuse but also to some extent Substance Depen-
dence. Substance Intoxication disorders, which also merit
attention, will not be addressed here due to space
constraints.
To begin a brief modern history of the nosology of Sub-
stance Abuse, one must start in 1952, with the publication
of the original DSM. There, Substance Abuse or drug
abuse was listed as a Sociopathic Personality Disturbance–
the same category that homosexuality was placed in
(which was finally removed in 1973 but its “treatment” not
fully repudiated until 1998 [28]. Both the DSM-I and
DSM-II were virtually identical to the ICD (International
Classification of Disease) nosology developed by the WHO
(World Health Organization). The DSM-III, released in
1980, was a significant break from this; it incorporated
approaches that were developed by researchers at
Washington University School of Medicine during the
1970’s. It introduced the multiaxial system of diagnostic
evaluation. In this schema, Substance Abuse, as a class of
Substance Use mental disorders, was classified under Axis
I, which was reserved for syndromes such as depression
and schizophrenia. For the first time, DSM-III classified
Substance Use mental disorders in a separate diagnostic
category distinct from the personality disorders. DSM-III-
R (revised) was released in 1987, and in 1988, the most
extensive process yet of reworking the Substance Use
mental disorders section began. This reworking was com-
pleted 6 years later with the release of the DSM-IV in
1994. With regards to Substance Use disorders, the most
significant change in the DSM-IV was the specific defini-
tion and clear enumeration of four free-standing, pathog-
n o m o n i cd i a g n o s t i cc r i t e r i af o rS u b s t a n c eA b u s em e n t a l
disorder, as distinguished from Substance Dependence
mental disorder [29].
Stepping back for a moment, it appears that in the his-
tory of Substance Abuse nosology, there was a time in his-
tory when the psychopathological category of ‘Substance
Abuse’ itself was on the chopping block, just barely escap-
ing deletion during the period between the DSM-III and
DSM-III-R. Schuckit [29] and Helzer [30], respectively,
writing in the DSM-IV Sourcebook, relay the following bits
of psychiatric lore:
The change between DSM-III and DSM-III-R repre-
sented an entire reorientation in the concept of abuse
and dependence...the term dependence was broadened
considerably. As a consequence, the framers of DSM-
III-R originally proposed to delete the concept of
abuse, feeling that the entire spectrum of substance-
related problems was now incorporated into the broad
concept of dependence. At the last minute, however,
pressure from the field required that the term abuse
be reinserted into the manual. However, abuse was
now viewed as a residual diagnosis that was to be
applied only to individuals who still had some sub-
stance-related difficulties but who did not fit into even
a broad approach to dependence [29](p.7)
...
In a personal communication to the Substance Use
Disorders Committee, Richard Frances recalled that
there was an attempt to drop the term abuse in the
DSM-III-R criteria, but that it was reinstituted at the
time of the field trials by the popular demand of those
attempting to use the new DSM-III-R criteria. [30]
(p.25)
Who might have been the most vocal opponents of the
Substance Use Disorders Committee’sp l a n n e dd e l e t i o n
–the ‘squeakiest’ wheels? It is unclear. Nevertheless, this
category of mental disorder known as ‘substance abuse’
has persisted, notwithstanding how ever so tenuously it
survived near-deletion or protestations about the essen-
tially pejorative nature of the diagnosis recorded in the
American Journal of Psychiatry [31,32]. The question
remains: how to go about characterizing it? A definition of
substance abuse emerged by consensus when the question
was posed to a panel of 99 substance abuse experts by
Rinaldi and colleagues [33]. Using this Delphic approach,
the expert panel concluded that ‘drug abuse’ is “any use of
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or social harm to the individual user or to others affected
by the drug user’sb e h a v i o r ” (quoted in [30](p.24)). The
current DSM-IV-TR (2000, TR = “Text Revision”) defini-
tion of substance abuse, with its four free-standing criteria
of distress or impairment manifestations accompanying
substance use patterns–shirking of work/school obliga-
tions, engaging in physically hazardous behavior, recurring
substance-related legal problems, and social/familial dis-
putes–is essentially based on the panel’s consensus defini-
tion. This four-criterion algorithm allows for 15 possible
criteria combinations (1 only, 2 only, 3 only, 4 only, 1+2
only, etc.) that will satisfy the diagnosis for Substance
Abuse. The focus of this paper’s inquiry is only on the
third diagnostic criterion for substance abuse mental dis-
order which describes persons engaged in a patterns of
substance use who present “clinically significant...distress”
“as manifested by...recurrent substance-related legal pro-
blems” which have “occurred repeatedly” or “been persis-
tent” in the past year (Criterion A3). The DSM-IV states
that if persistent or recurrent substance-related legal pro-
blems arise in conjunction with substance use, then that
substance use pattern is maladaptive and a Substance
Abuse mental disorder is the likely underlying diagnosable
psychopathology that explains the person’s “clinically sig-
nificant...distress.”
Rather than uncritically accepting this criterion as a fac-
tual description of psychopathy, the analysis here is direc-
ted towards potential depathologization of this criterion.
Such an orientation follows the lead of numerous medical
geographers in the field, such as Parr [34-36], Stock [37],
Gesler [38], and Jones and Moon [39], who advocate the
necessity of maintaining critical perspectives on highly
socially-contingent disease-like states and giving due
attention to alternative explanations for such states by
patient-subjects. This paper attempts to question the basis
of the A3 diagnostic criterion and depathologize the men-
tal distress described therein on the grounds that addi-
tional, unaccounted social variables influence the
manifestation of mental distress by some substance-related
legal problems. Issues with this ‘legal problems’ criterion
have, in fact, been raised by others in substance abuse and
general medical literatures. For example, Alexander [40],
in a paper in The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol
Abuse that presents a “Marijuana Screening Inventory”,
notes some difficulties with criterion A3, in the case of
Cannabis Abuse:
Subjective clinical judgment enters into Cannabis
Abuse criterion distinctions regarding the meaning of
‘recurrent’ or ‘maladaptive pattern.’ For example, legal
consequence risks are present with any marijuana use
level, but may remain latent, or risk exposure only if a
person drives or buys. Behavioral frequency cutoffs are
not sufficiently clear regarding ‘legal’ or ‘driving’ pro-
blems with marijuana to allow consistent clinical
agreement that a ‘recurrent’‘ maladaptive’ pattern
exists. (p.622)
Another commentator, Earleywine, a well-known aca-
demic psychologist who studies cannabis-related issues,
writes in a response letter questioning the conclusions of a
study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association about rising rates of cannabis abuse disorders
in a particular urban population that “recurrent mari-
juana-related legal problems qualify users for the abuse
diagnosis. Marijuana arrests increased dramatically in the
decade studied (1991-2001)...which could account for the
observed increases in the disorders” [41]. Earleywine’s
point rests on the necessity of establishing an analytically
useful distinction between cannabis use disorders and can-
nabis arrests, showing that more aggressive enforcement
of cannabis prohibition laws may better account for the
“observed increases in the disorders”, rather than any
uptick in underlying incidence of psychopathology.
What is most problematic about the criterion is that the
psychopathology-manifesting substance-related legal pro-
blems that the DSM-IV describes include those that arise
from nonviolent, ‘victimless infractions’ of substance prohi-
bition laws–in other words, legal charges or other legal
problems related to the possession, production, and phar-
macological delivery of contraband substances or discov-
ered metabolic evidence of their consumption. For
shorthand, these can be called substance-possession legal
problems (with metabolites being a form of ‘internal’ pos-
session). That such legal problems are also included in the
criterion’s assessment is absolutely indisputable as the
manual specifically enumerates them. Shown in Table 1 is
a comprehensive compilation of all the occurrences of the
concept of “legal problems” in the DSM-IV, all of which
appear in Substance-related disorders section of the man-
ual with the sole exception of a single reference made to
“legal difficulties” in the manual’s description of conduct
disorder. Italics have been added to highlight specific refer-
ences to legal problems that arise from nonviolent infrac-
tions. Simply reading the italicized words brings into relief
how these distressing legal problems, for the framers of the
DSM-IV, translate into mental disorder.
To recap, the codified, canonical diagnostic criteria
found in the DSM-IV-TR that health care providers use to
evaluate patients’ substance consuming patterns for Sub-
stance Abuse disorder require providers to take careful
note, ideally (but often not) in the course of a structured
interview, of “clinically significant...distress”. The DSM-IV-
TR states that this “distress” and the “maladaptive” sub-
stance use pattern that led to it can be “manifested by...
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“occurred repeatedly” or “been persistent” in the past year
to qualify for the disorder. The idea is that because some-
one is engaging in a continuing behavioral pattern of sub-
stance use despite the adverse consequence of legal
problems, s/he must be mentally disordered. The DSM-
IV-TR diagnostic criteria for substance use disorders do
not interrogate the substance control criminal sanction
systems in which patients live; substance-related legal pro-
blems are never themselves seen as the problem.U n d e r
this rubric, one’s experience of distress that is manifested
by pending or year-long persisting legal problems is
understood as mentally disordered in light of the ordinary
and ubiquitous nature of the globalized contraband biotic
substance prohibition enforcement regimes–i.e., the pre-
vailing order. These regimes are understood to be natura-
lized and normalized aspects of the environment; for
someone to run counter to them is understood as mala-
daptive, and any resultant distress is interpreted as a diag-
nostic sign of mental illness.
Banning biota and sowing the seeds of distress
Medical anthropologists have long reminded medical
social scientists to beware of slippage between pathology
and expressions of cultural and social difference. Merrill
Singer warned of this when he wrote: “the adaptationist
perspective appears to assign inequities in social rela-
tionships to the environment, thereby not only legitimiz-
ing those inequities as natural, but implying that the
noxious consequences of exploitation are indicators of
the maladaptation of politically and economically subor-
dinate groups” [14](p.226).
This paper’s contention is that current medical think-
ing on substance abuse has acquiesced to what could be
called ‘drug war diagnostics’.C o n s i d e ra na l t e r n a t e
explanation to account for a substance-using patient’s
mental distress as manifested by recurrent or persistent
biotic substance possession legal problems. What if their
mental distress is a normal response to a system of sub-
stance/social control that has itself set up a maladaptive
relationship with the psychoactive substance-replete
Table 1 Substance Abuse Mental Disorders and Possession-Related Legal Problems in DSM-IV-TR
a Substance Abuse mental disorder, diagnostic Criterion A3: “recurrent substance-related legal problems (e.g., arrests for substance-related
disorderly conduct)”
b Alcohol Abuse (305.00) mental disorder: “Legal difficulties may arise because of alcohol use (e.g., arrests for intoxicated behavior or
for driving under the influence).”
c Cannabis Abuse (305.20) mental disorder: “...legal problems that may occur as a consequence of arrests for cannabis possession.”
d Cocaine Abuse (305.60) mental disorder: “Legal difficulties may result from possession or use of the drug.”
e Hallucinogen Abuse (305.30) mental disorder: “...legal difficulties may arise due to behaviors that result from intoxication or possession
of hallucinogens.”
f Amphetamine Abuse (305.70) mental disorder: “Legal difficulties typically arise as a result of behavior while intoxicated with
amphetamines (especially aggressive behavior), as a consequence of obtaining the drug on the illegal market, or as a result of drug
possession or use. Occasionally, individuals with Amphetamine Abuse will engage in illegal acts (e.g., manufacturing amphetamines, theft)
to obtain the drug; however, this behavior is more common among those with Dependence.”
g Inhalant Abuse (305.90) mental disorder: “Users can also become agitated and even violent during intoxication, with subsequent legal
and interpersonal problems.”
h Opioid Abuse (305.50) mental disorder: “Legal difficulties may arise as a result of behavior while intoxicated with opioids or because an
individual has resorted to illegal sources of supply.”
i Phencyclidine Abuse (305.90) mental disorder: “Legal difficulties may arise due to possession of phencyclidine or to behaviors resulting
from Intoxication (e.g., fighting).”
j “The category of Substance Abuse does not apply to caffeine and nicotine";
k “The term abuse should be applied only to a pattern of substance use that meets the criteria for this disorder; the term should not be used as a
synonym for “use,”“ misuse,” or “hazardous use";
l “The essential feature of Substance Abuse is a maladaptive pattern of substance use manifested by recurrent and significant adverse
consequences related to the repeated use of substances. In order for an Abuse criterion to be met, the substance-related problem must have
occurred repeatedly during the same 12-month period or been persistent“;
m There may be recurrent substance-related legal problems (e.g., arrests for disorderly conduct, assault and battery, driving under the influence)
(Criterion A3)";
n “Substance-Related Disorders are distinguished from nonpathological substance use (e.g., “social” drinking) and from the use of medications for
appropriate medical purposes by the presence of a pattern of multiple symptoms occurring over an extended period of time (e.g., tolerance,
withdrawal, compulsive use) or the presence of substance-related problems (e.g., medical complications, disruption in social and family
relationships, vocational or financial difficulties, legal problems);
o “Although a diagnosis of Substance Abuse is more likely in individuals who have only recently started taking the substance, some individuals
continue to have substance-related adverse social consequences over a long period of time without developing evidence of Substance Dependence.”
Italics added.
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unreasonable then to expect people to adapt to a system
of biotic substance control committed to eradicating
whole botanical species, not only from their personal
lifeworlds, but also entirelyf r o mt h ef a c eo ft h ep l a n e t ,
save for a handful of authorized sites and personages?
The following section of the paper will critically assess
how this biotic substance control system spreads itself
biogeographically and sociospatially at multiple scales,
from a broad, global environmental level to the ultra-
local perspective of the individual consumer. In the so-
called “public health” campaign to prevent and control
substances abuse, State governing bodies the world over
have essentially extraprocedurally taken ownership of
entire species of naturally occurring, pharmacologically
active biota from the plant and fungal kingdoms–out of
the hundreds of types of naturally occurring psychoactive
biota–and criminalized their consumption outside of nar-
row, official channels. Ten species that evolved on Earth’s
biosphere are currently at the heart of this policy,
through direct or indirect reference in international, fed-
eral or state-level Schedules. They are: Papaver somni-
ferum L., Erythroxylum coca Lam, Cannabis sativa L.,
Lophophora williamsii J.M.C., 186 Psilocybe fungi spp.,
Catha edulis Vahl, Tabernanthe iboga L., Banisteriopsis
caapi C.V.M. &Psychotria viridis R u i z&P a v ,a n dSalvia
divinorum Epling & Játiva. More commonly, these are
known as opium, coca, cannabis, peyote, mushrooms,
khat, iboga, ayahuasca, and salvia. Of these, the first
three–opium, cannabis, and coca–have the longest stand-
ing ownership-bans in the modern era with the most far-
reaching consequences. These are in fact ownership-bans
because global biotic psychoactive substance prohibitions
grant legitimate, monopoly ownership of the biota–or,
at root, select germplasms (plant genetic resources)
(Figure 1)–wherever they may occur and at whatever
generational age of the species–to State authorities while
prohibiting safe access by others, literally bioimpoverish-
ing unauthorized billions through force or the threat of
force. Those who civilly disobey these regulations by con-
suming or facilitating consumption of contraband biota–
possession law violators–are, in effect, stealing from
world governments, hence, getting “busted”,a n dm a n y
are routinely charged for such crimes. The institution of
such bans on nature requires a historical act of biocoloni-
zation: a prior political call of species-wide, claim staking,
i.e., a depletion of the commons pool of plant genetic
resources through decree. It is this historical act that
allows the past participle form of the verb ‘control’ in the
phrase ‘controlled substances’ to assert itself as absolutely
commonplace and normalized.
The points in space of interaction between Homo
sapiens and these elements of banned non-human nat-
ure are points of material and sociocultural significance;
their geographies are shaped by ecological and sociopoli-
tical forces and thus easily lend themselves to the analy-
tic frame of political ecology. When a human being
comes into close contact with a banned botanical life
form in her or his environment, experienced psychoso-
cially at this most local scale is the rule of global scale
international and national prohibition laws that encircle
the botanical biota with boundaries which historically
have been shaped by sociopolitical forces of power,
influence, and authority–basic issues that concern politi-
cal economy–that have the effect of alienating indivi-
duals from freely associating with these elements of the
natural world. These are exactly the sorts of boundaries
that Robbins [7] is referring to when he writes:
In recent history, powerful modern institutions and
individuals ([e.g.,] environmental ministries, multina-
tional corporations, corrupt foresters) have gained
undue and disproportionate power by explicitly
attempting to divide and police the boundaries
between human and non-human nature, even while
allying themselves and building new connections to
the non-human world, leading to unintended conse-
quences and pernicious results. In the process, resis-
tance emerges from traditional, alternative, and
progressive human/non-human alliances margina-
lized by such efforts (usually along lines of gender,
class, and race) (p.213).
Contact with banned psychoactive biota is also ecologi-
cally mediated through the organic distribution of living
species, mutual adaptation (e.g., health-related behavior),
and co-evolution (e.g., selective cultivation), which influ-
ence how often and in what context human and non-
human species will come into gross and “deep” consump-
tive contact, the latter understood through the logics of
pharmacology, physiology and metabolism. It is readily
apparent, then, that the overall effects of the consump-
tion of banned biotic substances wherever they may
occur locally, such as those related to psychoactivation,
are never determined solely by material or biophysical
forces alone; rather, agency, culture, context, and psycho-
logical set play equally vital roles.
Biogeographic State ownership and control of whole
species of life in the service of substance abuse prevention
and control has a qualitative policy parallel only in the are-
nas of biological weapons control and endangered species
preservation. In the former category, unauthorized persons
found in ownership or possession of entire species of life
(or quasi-life) such as plague (Yersinia pestis), tularemia
(Francisella tularensis), Ebola virus, or processed deriva-
tives of these and other species are subject to criminal
sanctions. In the latter arena, unauthorized persons found
in ownership or possession of threatened or endangered
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nevadica lincolniana), the African violet (Saintpaulia
ionantha), and the White Rhinoceros (Ceratotherium
simum) are also subject to criminal sanctions. Exceptions
are commonly granted in both cases, and criminal penal-
ties are rarely delivered. Governments’ exertion of authori-
tative biogeographic control as per their international
treaty or convention obligations over potentially mass vio-
lence-causing biological agents and species threatened
with extinction has not led massive civil/political unrest or
strife, mainly because these policies do not undermine
basic social goals of peace, development, and sustainability.
In essence, there is no valued benefit to exposing people to
highly virulent pathogens or to wiping out endangered
species that is being undermined, although these
prohibitions are balanced against the fulfillment of peo-
ple’s desires to own biological weapons for self-defense or
people’s desires to consume and possess endangered spe-
c i e sf o ra p h r o d i s i ao rs p o r t .
On the other hand, the banning of ten biota out of the
hundreds with psychoactive potential, while heavily and
yet often duplicitously enforced, do not further the goals
of public health and safety as they are purported to do.
On the contrary, they have led, over the course of several
decades, to a significant amount of corruption, chaos and
instability (secondary to money laundering), structural
violence, direct violence (secondary to black markets),
morbidity (such as untreated problematic substance use
and the significant spread of HIV and HCV due to needle
sharing and inaccessible clean injection equipment),
Figure 1 Key Contraband Germplasms. (from top left, rightward) Coca: http://web.archive.org/web/20061018053434/http://www.ethnogarden.
com/cart/index.pl/catid_77/proid_292/_/_/CocaSeeds/ErythroxylumCoca, Khat: http://www.shamanica.com/Catha%20edulis.asp, Chacruna: http://
web.archive.org/web/20061018155352/http://www.ethnogarden.com/cart/index.pl/catid_77/proid_250/_/_/Chacruna/PsychotriaViridis, Yage:
http://www.shamanic-extracts.com/xcart/shamanic-products/banisteriopsis-caapi-seeds.html, Cannabis: http://www.cannabisculture.com/articles/
4477.html, Opium: http://www.plantcultures.org.uk/plants/opium_poppy_traditional_medicine.html, Peyote: http://tryptamind.com/grow_peyote.
html, Iboga: http://www.shamanic-extracts.com/xcart/shamanic-products/tabernanthe-iboga-seeds.html, Salvia Divinorum: http://www.
sagewisdom.org/sdseeds.html Psilocybe: http://www.erowid.org/plants/mushrooms/mushrooms_cultivation_az2.shtml.
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lengthy mass incarceration (1 in 99 adults were incarcer-
ated in the US at the beginning of 2008, with non-violent
offenders being the majority and drug offenders held the
longest), execution (including summary and extra-judi-
cial), ecological harms (e.g., from aerial spraying of herbi-
cides), educational harms (e.g., teaching misinformation,
exaggerating rare and lurid sequelae of psychoactive sub-
stance use to frighten youth into abstinence, withholding
lifesaving harm reduction knowledge), and opportunity
cost globally [19,42-57]. At root, this is because bans on
psychoactive botanical biota, regardless of whatever ‘hid-
den agendas’ may additionally be at work, undermine
longstanding medicinal, cultural, and religious practices
and unsuccessfully attempt to politically suppress what
m a yw e l lb ea na c q u i r e du n i v e r s a lh u m a nd r i v ef o rp s y -
choactivation through categorically forbidding natural
substances and policing populations for compliance
[58-60]. This policy, often called a ‘war on drugs’ or ‘drug
abuse prevention and control’ is seen by those who bear
its brunt as a low-grade, persistent, prisoner taking war
on steeped in the ideology of pharmacologicalism in
which some substances are allowed and encouraged for
psychoactivation (e.g, tobacco, alcohol, caffeine, sugar,
cacao) and others, such as those listed above, are forbid-
den. Through this ideology, which ultimately makes no
distinction between psychoactive substances that are of
biotic or abiotic origins, numerous substances such as
the Controlled-305 in the United States Code have come
under the globalized system of differential prohibition.
Since human drives must prevail for life to go on, there
will always be a demand for these officially prohibited
substances as long as there is information available about
their effects. By creating a regulatory vacuum, substance
prohibitions essentially ensure that the drive to psychoac-
tivate, which may well be established in future research,
will be met by and large in the most exploitative and
damaging manner–maximizing harm and minimizing
benefit at both the population and individual levels. An
earnest attempt at public health would at the very least
reduce the harms associated with the consumption of
psychoactive substances by ensuring that such substances
are safely self-administered, made available through safe
and regulated channels with known and unadulterated
compositions, and that the public is given factual, evi-
dence-based education about their effects.
It is only diplomats and politicians from a past era who
have created this unique biotic constellation carved out
with scientific botanical taxonomy–this biogeographic
catalogue of ten different types of banned germplasm.
That these germplasms are members of a common class
is strictly historical artifact and not due to any natural
grouping. Authority-holders’ enactment of biotic prohibi-
tions has created an il/legal natural geographic lifeworld
mapping for nearly every world citizen in which whole
species and subsubspecies of botanicals have become
bounded up and encircled by prohibitionist-pharmacolo-
gicalist borders that were drawn without civic engage-
ment or due process afforded to the most heavily affected
populations. Each species so bounded has a unique ecol-
ogy, a unique consumption-efficacy profile, and a unique
environmental and human utilization history. Each encir-
cling biotic prohibition inscribed around a natural species
is a unique ‘map feature’ of an individual’s lifeworld that
presents distinct ‘lost opportunities’ for their utilization
of that biota to fulfill part of their medicine and health
care delivery, nutritional, religious, chemurgic, and/or
safe psychoactivation needs–all remaining virtually inac-
cessible to law-abiding citizens and society at large who
are taught ‘thou shalt not unlawfully trespass’ the extra-
procedurally drawn boundary lines. The vast majority of
citizens will not want to openly disobey these rules by
crossing the boundaries for fear of arrest and associated
penalogic social, civil, and bodily death threats–pain
delivery–that is ongoing and virtually omnipresent. As a
resultant adaptive strategy, nearly all boundary-crossing
is done clandestinely under the cover of a ‘black’ or
underground half-trillion dollar market (alone worth per-
haps 10%+ of total global market exchange) [9] or
through private non-commercial land use and exchange.
M o r eo f t e nt h a nn o t ,e n ds u b s t a n c ec o n s u m e r sa r ef a r
removed from the cultivation and ecological embedded-
ness of the biota they consume.
Asserting the human right to health
It is those who are using biotic substances and are discov-
ered or detected, possibly through acts of accidental indis-
cretion, and charged with violations of substance
possession laws that are the focus of this inquiry. They
have transgressed laws that purport to prevent and con-
trol, at the population level, the very mental disorder that
they stand to be diagnosed with. Should not an attempt be
made to distinguish bona fide psychopathology from
transgressions of laws supposedly meant to prevent and
control that psychopathology? Legal problems or not, do
people have a right to consume biotic substances? This
question has been generally explored from a legal perspec-
tive by Boire using ideas related to freedom of thought, or
“cognitive liberty”, but consideration vis-à-vis the human
right to health is a little-explored approach [61]. Drug con-
trol within the UN system is technically subordinate to
other higher order principles, such as the promotion of
human rights [62]. The immediate-past United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Health has
highlighted “the indispensable role of health professionals
in the promotion and protection of the right to health”
[63]. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (CESCR), a body of independent experts that
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its State par-
ties, was established by the United Nations Charter-cre-
ated Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN
General Assembly under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 of
28 May 1985 to carry out the monitoring functions
assigned to the ECOSOC. The Committee has acknowl-
edged that the human right to health “is closely related to
and dependent upon the realization of other human rights,
as contained in the International Bill of Rights, including
the rights to food, housing, work, education, human dig-
nity, life, non-discrimination, equality, the prohibition
against torture, privacy, access to information, and the
freedoms of association, assembly and movement” [64].
The human right to health, as enumerated in international
law, implies certain freedoms and entitlements such as
“the right to control one’sh e a l t ha n db o d y ...and the right
to a system of health protection which provides equality of
opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level
of health” (emphasis added) [64]. The current UN Special
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Health, Anand Grover,
has proposed a new international drug control framework
grounded in the human right to health that would call for
“assessment of the scientific evidence of a drug’s effects on
the individual and the public” and “the public health and
human rights effects of each controlled drug.” It addition-
ally would allow for “traditional, cultural use of drugs,
whose public health impact has been shown to be very
limited, such as coca leaves in Bolivia and various forms of
cannabis in India” [65]. It may well be argued that the
right to determine food and drug preferences ought to be
seen as a natural consequence of human dignity, especially
vis-à-vis the human right to health, and the legitimate role
of public policy ought to be harm minimization (as
described above) and benefit maximization as related to
these preferences [66]. The concept and term “benefit
maximization” as a corollary and complementary goal to
harm reduction in contemporary drug policy was origin-
ally articulated by Tupper, in reference to the globalization
of ayahuasca drinking [67]. This should apply equally well
to drugs or substances which are preferred for intoxication
or other practices that are associated with psychoactiva-
tion. UCLA psychopharmacologist Ronald Siegel has writ-
ten in his book Intoxication: The Universal Drive for
Mind-Altering Substances [58] that
the medical purpose of intoxication is easier to
understand if we think of intoxicating drugs as adap-
togens. Technically, an adaptogen is a substance that
helps people adjust to changes in their physical or
psychological environments...Intoxicating drugs med-
icate the needs of the...drive for a change in state or
mood...the pursuit of intoxication serves a legitimate
medical purpose. The solution to the drug problems
of our species begins when we acknowledge the legiti-
mate place of intoxication in our behavior. (p.308-9)
Satisfying the putative acquired human drive for psy-
choactivation is a health issue and must be examined
with ethics, reason, and patience–not with the usual
hilarity, levity, and flippancy that dominates much dis-
cussion of this topic in the mainstream media, some pol-
icymaking circles, and countless casual conversations the
first author has witnessed as a result of discussants’ reli-
ance on tropes from popular culture, memories of past
embodied experiences or inclinations toward future
sought out experiences of pleasure, and/or unexamined
privileged positions of distance from the excesses of
structurally violent drug enforcement regimes. To sum-
marize, prohibitionist drug laws are, at root, a violation
of the right to control one’s health and body–essential
pillars of the human right to health. Thus, in the authors’
estimation, it is difficult to understand how the self-
administration of any drug or substance per se can be
understood as a criminal act; rather, this paper argues
that the criminalization of drug consumption itself must
be seen as an illegal act by States insofar as it violates
their obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human
right to health.
An Alternative Framework: Harm Reduction and
Benefit Maximization
What is readily apparent from a critical political ecology
of disease perspective is that before a substance abuse
mental disorder diagnosis can be made, patient-centered,
subjectivist perspective demands scrutiny of the political
context for patients’“ substance-related problems”.T h i s
would entail ethically interrogating the basis of the
“legal” aspects of patients’ problems, as well as seeking to
uncover “hidden agendas” that may be at work [17]
(p.449). This paper argues that the success or failure of a
so-called public health regulation like a substance abuse
prevention and control law as it applies to a particular
patient-citizen, i.e., whether or not he or she has distress-
fully transgressed the regulation, ought not to be the
grounds on which a mental disorder diagnosis is made.
Rather, the diagnosis of substance abuse mental disorder
should be made based on whether or not the individual
patient does indeed engage in problematic substance
consumption practices. Just because the Substance Abuse
prevention and control law, a supposed public health
measure, has been flouted–with distressing consequences
for the patient–does not mean that this is a sure sign that
mental disorder is present in the patient. After all, how a
patient-citizen’s consumption practices came to articulate
spatiotemporally with the public health regime of sub-
stance abuse disorder prevention and control to generate
‘their’“ legal problems” is not simply a function of their
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cerity of the public health regulation, regulatory trans-
gressions may not be a sign of mental disorder, but
rather one of governmental disorder. This possibility
must be sincerely entertained, and the upcoming edition
of the DSM should recognize this.
An alternative approach to, for example, cannabis abuse
diagnostics applied to a hypothetical patient-citizen in the
United States based on the findings presented in this
paper would be to jettison legal problems as a useful cri-
terion to gauge cannabis abuse. Cannabis-related legal
problems are unreliable indicators of psychopathology, not
to mention often unjust [68]. It is better to focus on parti-
cular problems associated with an individual’s cannabis
consumption [69,70]. In fact, the whole substance use/
abuse dichotomy ought to be discarded and the transition
be made to a spectrum view, as has been adopted by the
British Columbia Ministry of Health. In their framework
for addressing problematic substance use [71], they
include the diagram below (Figure 2) and note:
The Framework recognizes that instances or patterns
of substance use occur along a spectrum from benefi-
cial use to non-problematic use to problematic use
(including potentially harmful use and substance use
disorders). Substance use disorders represent the
extreme and most damaging end of the spectrum.
Some people choose to abstain from using psychoac-
tive substances while some people choose to use only
certain substances. It is important to emphasize that
abstinence is a healthy lifestyle option. Nevertheless,
many people choose to use substances and some do
not develop serious problems because of this use. (p. 8)
Though they do not abandon the substance use disor-
ders nosology in this particular model, the government of
British Columbia takes an enlightened approach to under-
standing psychoactive substance use. Applying this to
cannabis use, it is clear that cannabis consumption can be
beneficial, non-problematic, or problematic for the consu-
mer. Distinguishing between problematic and non-proble-
matic use is straightforward: probe for the existence of
medical/psychosocial problems, leaving legal issues aside
as a Dutch health care provider would be inclined to do,
given the Netherlands’ system of de facto cannabis (re)
legalization. If problems are identified, attention should be
focused on reducing those particular harms associated
with cannabis use for the patient-citizen. Distinguishing
between non-problematic versus beneficial use of cannabis
is more difficult, given the relaxant properties of cannabis
use, and given consumers’ tendency to reduce or substi-
tute for alcohol consumption, which has its own health
benefits. Perhaps this determination, if it must be made at
all, ought to be done on strictly subjective grounds, as per
“the new subjective medicine” that seeks to take “the
patient’s point of view” on matters related to health status
and withdrawal of life-support [72]. Given that cannabis is
not recognized as a medicine at the federal level and in 34
states, it is likely that consumers may not be ‘looking’ for
medicinal or beneficial effects, though when doctors and
patients do find them, they ought to be free to use them.
A questionnaire that focuses on quality of life, stress
reduction, spirituality, somaesthetics [73], self-directed
psychotherapeutics, self-care, and related issues would
likely help to elicit beneficial aspects of cannabis consump-
tion that a consumer may only be dimly aware of on open-
ended questioning.
Continuing with the cannabis example, one aspect of
cannabis consumption that risks total neglect (and ‘abuse’,
if you will) in substance use/abuse and related discourses
is the relationship that human beings develop with envir-
onmental biota that they discover, produce and consume,
such as plants, and in particular the cannabis plant.
Appreciation, seed planting, nurturing, harvesting, and
consumption of cannabis are all part of a human-environ-
ment relationship between two biotic species that both
descended from a common evolutionary ancestor between
1 and 2 billion years ago [74,75]. Medical geographer
Hester Parr, in her 2006 talk at the University of Washing-
ton Department of Geography Colloquium, spoke about
the emotional benefits that mental patient-citizens glean
through their experience with gardening and plant care.
Her research showed that horticultural practices helped to
“ground” patient-citizens. One respondent noted: “You
slow your thoughts down to the speed of the plant and
what’s happening to it.” Another said: “...you go into a sort
of trance.” A third said: “You can go into this place that is
not you and it’s not the world” (2006, first author’sn o t e s
from lecture). While such reactions may not be specific to
human relations with plants and may occur as a part of
Figure 2 Spectrum of Psychoactive Substance Use. From “Every
Door Is The Right Door: a British Columbia planning framework to
address problematic substance use and addiction.” May 2004.
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relationships can have cultural and therapeutic aspects to
them. This side of cannabis consumption and production
is totally neglected in modern ‘use/abuse/dependence’
discourses.
Problematic use of any and all of the “Controlled 305”
substances–plus alcohol–can be referred to with the diag-
nosis of Substance Abuse mental disorder, effectively elid-
ing their diverse pharmacology. A tremendous amount of
confusion is created by this scattered grouping of 306 che-
micals and organisms into a catch-all term of ‘Substances’,
‘drugs’, or the pejorative term, ‘dope.’ Frequently alcohol is
distinguished from the rest with vapid phraseology such as
“alcohol and drugs.” With such terminology, it is easy to
see how and why the most problematic aspects of use of
certain ‘substances’ in the list of 305 Controlled Sub-
stances can become misattributed to use of any other par-
ticular ‘Substance’ in the classification. As this paper has
attempted to show, the use of proper language is critically
important in the arenas of substance regulation policy and
substance-related diagnostics. The following is a quote
from McGill University Law Professor Desmond Mander-
son’s paper entitled the “Archaeology of Drug Laws” [76]
that underscores the importance of using accurate lan-
guage when discussing drug policy. Manderson examines
the universal tone of ferocity and repulsion at ugliness that
is betokened in drug laws in the twentieth century. He
places the word ‘narcotic’, which appears in the 1914 Har-
rison Narcotic Act, the first punitive federal drug law in
the United States, in its historical context when answering
the question: “What is the effect of the endemic use of this
word?”
It implies that the substances previously identified only
as ‘dangerous’ are united in their medical and pharma-
cological nature as well as by their legal status. There
is a patina of scientific legitimacy attached to that cru-
cial word ‘narcotics’. By using it, the title tells us to
expect a certain kind of scientific substance to be dealt
with. The frame gives medical legitimacy to the like
treatment of the substances dealt with in the Act.
Clearly the language of the title is a nonsense: neither
cocaine nor cannabis is a narcotic (i.e. sedative). By
categorising them using a technical medical term,
however, their legal treatment was shored up with
scientific authority, all the while underscoring the
belief that ‘drug use’ itself was a medical problem.
‘Narcotics’ in the first place gives the illusion of a
scientific basis to legal policy and, second, presents the
drug question as a medical rather than a moral issue.
The word acts as a legitimation and a defense of gov-
ernment intervention. Here, then, we see the power of
the language of the title to construct a reality, to
expropriate authority by the use of persuasive words,
and to redefine a social event–the consumption of
cannabis, for example–by placing it within a frame so
that it becomes seen to be scientifically dangerous and
medically unjustifiable.
The language of narcosis, however, while it reflected
and effected a focus on the medical dangers of drug
use alien ...was, by the 1970s, no longer an adequate
description and justification of people’s fears...by
[then]...the concern over drug use...[was]...to do
partly...with the non-medical or recreational use of
drugs...The drug user may not be suffering from any
medical problem but he or she is nevertheless ‘abusing’
drugs. In fact, the power of the language comes exactly
from the intentional conflation of use with misuse and
abuse.
Conclusion
Moving into a post-’drug war’ era, society will need a fuller
understanding of the penal pain inflicted en masse by the
current system per banned substance. In order to maxi-
mize consumer-related health protection and safeguards
in public policy while at the same time realizing their full-
est potential in medicine, each of the ten banned botanical
species will require a separate medical geographic treat-
ment through the lens of the political ecology of health
and disease, as each presents unique health justice policy
issues and challenges. The human-environment relation-
ships surrounding each will require ‘daylighting’,ac o n c e p t
borrowed from urban design and planning which normally
refers to a process by which an underground stream is
redirected into an above-ground channel where it is visible
by the light of day. In the context of biotic substance use,
daylighting means the application of scholarly labor so
that the light of understanding is shone on underground
human-environment relationships which are presently in
the dark and out of view. For example, with coca, a long-
standing Andean medicinal and sacramental plant, comes
issues related to the concentration and isolation the alka-
loid cocaine, which occurs naturally as 0.1% by weight of
the leaf, and its conversion to crack cocaine with the addi-
tion of baking soda (sodium bicarbonate) and heat. Addi-
tionally, with opium, also an invaluable medicinal plant
with cross-cultural roots, comes issues related to the con-
centration and isolation of morphine, which is about 10%
by weight of dried poppy juice, and its conversion to her-
oin (diacetyl morphine) with the addition of dry vinegar
(acetic anhydride) and heat. A political ecology of health
must necessarily attend to these concentrates and the con-
texts in which they are produced from mature botanicals,
distributed in an underground economy, and consumed.
As far as biotic substance use-related mental distress man-
ifested by possession-related legal problems is concerned,
the critical political ecology of disease approach applied
here has been successful in depathologizing this mental
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Page 13 of 15distress and seeing it instead as a product of a structurally
violent substance abuse prevention policy gone too far,
undermining fundamental human-environment biotic
relations and the human right to health.
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